(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.

(2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply to all pending and subsequently filed actions.

Sources: Codes, 1880, § 2669; 1892, § 2737; Laws, 1906, § 3097; Hemingway's 1917, § 2461; Laws, 1930, § 2292; Laws, 1942, § 722; Laws, 1989, ch. 311, § 3; Laws, 1990, ch. 348, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 12, 1990).

§ 15-1-57. Statute of limitations not to run when person prohibited to sue.

When any person shall be prohibited by law, or restrained or enjoined by the order, decree, or process of any court in this state from commencing or prosecuting any action or remedy, the time during which such person shall be so prohibited, enjoined or restrained, shall not be computed as any part of the period of time limited by this chapter for the commencement of such action.

Sources: Codes, 1857, ch. 57, art. 26; 1871, § 2170; 1880, § 2691; 1892, § 2758a; Laws, 1906, § 3120; Hemingway's 1917, § 2484; Laws, 1930, § 2307; Laws, 1942, § 737.

§ 15-1-59. Saving in favor of persons under disabilities.

If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. However, the saving in favor of persons under disability of unsoundness of mind shall never extend longer than twenty-one (21) years.

Sources: Codes, Hutchinson's 1848, ch. 57, art. 1 (7); 1857, ch. 57, art. 12; 1871, § 2156; 1880, § 2677; 1892, § 2746; Laws, 1906, § 3106; Hemingway's 1917, § 2470; Laws, 1930, § 2308; Laws, 1942, § 738; Laws, 1983, ch. 482, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

§ 15-1-67. Effect of fraudulent concealment of cause of action

If a person liable to any personal action shall fraudulently conceal the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered.

Sources: Codes, 1857, ch. 57, art. 14; 1871, § 2158; 1880, § 2679; 1892, § 2749; Laws, 1906, § 3109; Hemingway's 1917, § 2473; Laws, 1930, § 2312; Laws, 1942, § 742.

Commentary:

The Mississippi Court of Appeals has applied the State's discovery and fraudulent concealment provisions very narrowly. For example, in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, 947 So.2d 983 (2006), the court ruled that the because the acts are physical, a reasonable person is aware of them when they occur. The Plaintiff's claim that she was unaware that the acts were abusive and did not connect the acts to her emotional problems were rejected by the Court. In addition, the Court imposes a "reasonable diligence" requirement upon the victim. The Court also ruled that the victim failed to demonstrate that the Defendants participated in any affirmative acts to prevent discovery of the claim or that she exercised due diligence in an attempt to discover the claim.

The standard for disability tolling is very high in Mississippi. For example, in Rockwell v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., the Court ruled that It is unnecessary for a party to show formal adjudication of incompetence, however, the claimant must prove that he or she "lacked the requisite understanding for handling his legal affairs." 710 So.2d 388, (Miss. 1998).

Resources:

Mississippi Statutes

Mississippi Coalition Against Sexual Abuse