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Summary
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Cases and Commentary | Resources
Summary:
Georgia's special
statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse provides that
victims may bring civil actions within 5 years of reaching their age of
majority. Ga. Code Ann.
§9-3-33.1 (2007)
Disability Tolling.
Georgia's general tolling statute, Ga.
Code Ann. § 9-3-91, provides that a
disability tolls the applicable limitation during the period of the
disability.
Text of Statute:
§ 9-3-33.1. Childhood sexual abuse
(a) As used in this Code section, the term "childhood sexual abuse"
means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which act
occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and which act
would have been proscribed by Code Section 16-6-1, relating to rape;
Code Section 16-6-2, relating to sodomy and aggravated sodomy; Code
Section 16-6-3, relating to statutory rape; Code Section 16-6-4,
relating to child molestation and aggravated child molestation; Code
Section 16-6-5, relating to enticing a child for indecent purposes; Code
Section 16-6-12, relating to pandering; Code Section 16-6-14, relating
to pandering by compulsion; Code Section 16-6-15, relating to
solicitation of sodomy; Code Section 16-6-22, relating to incest; Code
Section 16-6-22.1, relating to sexual battery; or Code Section
16-6-22.2, relating to aggravated sexual battery, or any prior laws of
this state of similar effect which were in effect at the time the act
was committed.
(b) Any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of
childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within five years of the date
the plaintiff attains the age of majority.
Commentary and Cases:
In
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools,172 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1999), the
Federal courts interpreted the Georgia statute of limitations for
childhood sexual abuse within the context of a federal claim under Title
IX of the Education Act. In so doing, the court explained that the
Georgia statute was made explicitly non-retroactive by the legislature.
This statute, however, was not adopted until 1992; the
legislation which enacted it states: "No action for childhood sexual
abuse which, prior to July 1, 1992, has been barred by the
provisions of Title 9 [regarding statutes of limitations], shall be
revived by this Act."
1992 Ga. Laws 2473, § 2.
In addition, the court explained that the Georgia legislature did not
intend that the common law discovery rule apply to cases permitted by
the statute:
Although the original version of this statute adopted the
discovery rule to accomplish this goal, some members of the Georgia
legislature opposed adopting the rule because they believed the
uncertainty of such a long limitations period was unfair to
potential defendants. As a compromise, the legislature replaced the
discovery rule with the five-year limitations period that section
9-3-33.1 now features. See Jami Philpott, Legislative Review,
9 Ga. St. U.L.Rev. 154, 155-57 (1992). Thus, the Georgia legislature
clearly did not intend the discovery rule to apply to claims
governed by section 9-3-33.1.
Regarding disability tolling, the Georgia court ruled that "the test for is
whether the individual, being of unsound mind, could not manage the
ordinary affairs of his life." Walker v. Brannan, 243 Ga. App.
235; 533 S.E.2d 129 (2000) (automobile accident case).
Resources:
Revised
09/04/2007. Copyright Susan
K. Smith
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